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NOTI CE
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored
by the Unites States Government. Neither the United
States nor the United States Department of Energy, nor
any of their employees, nor any of their contractors,
subcontractors, or their employees, makes any warranty,
express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or
responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or useful-
ness of any information, apparatus, product or process
disclosed or represents that its use would not infringe
privately owned rights.
I_ _ C_ __ _·__ I _
I - - -·I -- - --- ·-- - ·r -- - · ·ru.
On December 19, 1977 a one-day workshop on institutional
aspects of nuclear proliferation resistance was held at the Harvard
Program for Science and International Affairs (PSAI), 9 Divinity
Avneue, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The workshop was organized
by the MIT Department of Nuclear Engineering, PSIA, and the US
Department of Energy (DOE), and was sponsored by DOE in conjunc-
tion with its Non-Proliferation Alternative Systems Assessment
Program (NASAP). The co-chairmen were Albert Carnesale of PSIA,
Hugh Kendrick of DOE, and Marvin Miller of MIT.
The objective of the meeting was to improve our understanding
of the overall structure of the proliferation problem and the
role institutional/political arrangements can play in support of
technological measures to prevent proliferation. Specifically,
the workshop sought to focus attention on three related aspects
of the proliferation problems; i.e.,
1. Can a set of attributes be used to establish meaningful
criteria for the proliferation resistance of nuclear
systems? In general, what is the utility of a game/
decision theory approach to proliferation?
2. Assuming that a methodology involving attributes is use-
ful, what is the impact of institutional arrangements
such as international fuel service centers on the values
of attributes? That is, how effective are institutional
arrangements as complements to technological barriers in
providing proliferation resistance.
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3. Does international control or ownership of fuel cycle
facilities serve non-proliferation objectives enough
so that the effort to structure such centers is worth
the political and other costs it may entail?
Marvin Miller of MIT, Henry Rowen of Stanford and Laurence
Scheinman of the US State Department made formal presentations,
Hugh Kendrick of DOE introduced NASAP, Albert Carnesale of PSIA
presided as the workshop chairman, and Thomas Schelling of Harvard
provided concluding observations. The following is a summary of
the day's discussions culled from therapporteur's notes and tapes;
the workshop Agenda and List of Participants follow the summary.
Morning Session
A. Carnesale, fresh from a meeting in Vienna of the technical
coordinating committee of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation
study (INFCE), opened the workshop with a brief progress report on
INFCE, which he likened to an "international Ford-Mitre study'with
a focus on nonproliferation. He outlined the missions of the eight
INFCE working groups, and drew the distinction between the mission
of NASAP and that of INFCE. NASAP will provide technical support
for the US role in INFCE, but as a national effort, it will tread
onground which is clearly inappropriate for international consump-
tion; e.g., studies related to fabrication of weapons derived from
fuel cycle materials. H. Kendrick elaborated on the goals of
NASAP. These have changed to a certain extent since the program
was initiated in April 1977--antedating INFCE by approximately
six months--but its primary focus remains the same; i.e., to
identify nuclear power systems which offer a high degree of pro-
liferation resistance and have all the other requisite virtues;
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e.g., efficient resource utilization, commercial acceptability,
and high marks in the safety and environmental impact areas.
Kendrick stressed that DOE was open to suggestions from all quar-
ters, and, in particular, was seeking advice in devising criteria
for judging the proliferation resistance of nuclear systems.
M. Miller
In his paper, "Attributes, Decisions, Games and Proliferation
Resistance," Miller illustrated how the proliferation resistance
problem looks from the vantage point of decision/game theory. He
spoke of both the promise and pitfalls involved in this approach;
among the latter he mentioned in particular the difficulty of
"getting inside the proliferator's head" to get a sense for which
of the attributes which (hopefully) characterize proliferation re-
sistance are most important to specific nth countries in particular
situations. A methodology would be valuable as a guide to a
logical analysis of the proliferation problem, but it could not
tell us when we had neglected or misjudged an important piece of
information. That is, it must be seen as a complement to, not
as a substitute for, creative insight and imagination. Miller
concluded with some remarks about the need for more study of
the feasibility of incremental sanctions for incremental viola-
tions--a theme which was taken up later by several of the other
participants--and the problems involved when there are more than
two players actively involved in the "proliferation game."
Discussion
Carnesale prefaced the discussion with a suggestion that the
participants focus on describing attributes of proliferation-
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resistance and on how to measure them. (This suggestion was
largely ignored.)
H. Rowen of Stanford opened the discussion by noting the
importance of exposing the civilian cover of nuclear programs
which had joint military and civilian objectives. One of the
means to this end would be to examine the economic rationale of
going nuclear as a source of energy, particularly in the LDC's.
However, he didn't wish to underestimate the problems associated
with applying an economic test; e.g., there were no agreed-upon
criteria for evaluating the economic worth of a civilian nuclear
program. The case was complicated by a history of promotional
activity by suppliers on behalf of nuclear power which has provided
justification for economically unsound civilian programs.
R. Rosenthal of DOE and L. Scheinman of the US State Depart-
ment referred to the desire of many countries for energy inde-
pendence and technological prestige--"the national airlines
syndrome"--as factors that further complicate the search for an
unambiguous test of covert weapon objectives.
W. Harris of Rand thought that Rowen's economic criteria were
relevant, notwithstanding the difficulty of applying them. If
some nth country expressed interest in having a reprocessing plant
so large that it would clearly optimize plutonium output rather
than minimize the cost of electricity, the signal would be loud
and clear. In other cases, such as using a breeder program to
justify reprocessing, it would be much harder to get additional
warning by making an economic analysis of the program.
J. Dietrich of Combustion Engineering and N. Rasmussen of
MIT criticized the preoccupation within NASAP on finding new fuel
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cycles which would offer dramatic increases in proliferation
resistance. Such systems, if they did exist, were far down the
road as far as technological maturity was concerned. Meanwhile,
there would soon be 500 reactor systems extant, 400 of which
would be LWRs, and we had to solve the proliferation problem
posed by these systems. Future reactor systems would take two
or three decades to develop and install; we had time to deal
with them but could not for the present ignore the LWR system.
M. Nacht of PSIA suggested to M. Miller that he (Miller)
attempt to validate the decision theory approach to the non-
proliferation problem by demonstrating that it jibed with the
historical record; he suggested Israel as a good test case.
F. Culler of ORNL liked Nacht's idea, but thought that Israel
was not representive of nth countries which are going nuclear.
H. Raiffa of the Harvard Business School, also referring
to issues raised in Miller's talk, felt that the public debate
was focusing the methodology effort. If you looked at other areas,
it was hard to articulate the basic attributes of a problem;
if you tried to do it in the abstract, the most important attri-
butes were invariably left out. Finding attributes was an
iterative process. Quantification was not as important in the
beginning as taking the logical first steps.
Rowen, returning to NASAP, was troubled by the excessively
abstract nature of much of the work undertaken there. There
were nuclear programs and there were countries; specific cases
could be examined to great effect. In doing so, one discovered
that the role of suppliers was not all that important; regional
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problems seemed to dominate the concerns of the proliferation
candidates. T. Greenwood of OSTP contrasted Rowen's specific
case-by-case approach with the need to seek an international con-
sensus cast in general terms. Rowen replied that he didn't
disagree with Greenwood or Nacht, but when modeling it was prefer-
able to look at the problems concretely.
Harris suggested that Miller incorporate alternative rules
of trade for international nuclear commerce when he played his
two-person games between supplier and proliferator. He was
certain that these rules of trade were more important in deter-
mining outcomes than technical fuel cycle choices.
Culler reminded the participants that President
Carter's emphasis on nonproliferation marked a dramatic shift
in US policy. For example, we had approximately ten years of
timely warning concerning India's nuclear intentions and decided
to do nothing to prevent the inevitable detonation in 1974. This
remark prompted Gray of International Energy Associates to sug-
gest that it might be better not to have too much time so we
could react from the gut. In a similar vein, G. Rathjens of
MIT later commented that even if we were unprepared to react to
ambiguous information, some countries might be more prepared
to do so, in which case it was better that nobody have the in-
formation.
L. Dunn of Hudson Institute pointed out that the threat
of pre-emptive proliferation or a regional "stampede" decreased
with greater warning time. M. Nacht suggested that regional stam-
pedes and pre-emptive proliferation were empirically unverified.
- __ _ - I _ _-- -- ·---------- ·~p_~---E
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Harris agreed with Dunn that the likelihood of highly
accurate warning would decrease the incentives to proliferate.
However, as a practical matter, warning systems were not so
finely tuned, and if there were any incentive for early pre-
diction, there was a danger that an imprecise warning system
would encourage pre-emptive action. He felt that most of the
sources of warning were independent of the fuel cycle. In the
past we have received early, albeit ambiguous warning, but lacked
any agreement on procedures to handle the information, much less
any agreement on sanctions.
Carnesale articulated the developing consensus among the
participants that deciding on what to do with warning in advance
was at least as important as the length of time involved in warn-
ing. He thought that this consensus implied the need for inter-
national arrangements.
T. Schelling of Harvard directed the group's attention to
the potential audience for early warning inside the proliferating
country. It would be useful to know how far foreign countries
could go toward shortening or lengthening lead times before
committing themselves to a bomb program or provoking reactions
from a group inside or outside the government; e.g., the political
opposition, the military establishment, and the general public.
We need a rich typology of decision points and lead times for dif-
ferent types of governments. Schelling added it was sometimes
embarrassing to be triggered at unwelcome times. W. Donnelly
of the Congressional Research Service proposed that the level
of internal opposition to nuclear power be one criterion for
evaluating proliferation resistance.
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Greenwood cautioned that specifying sanctions ahead of
time gave countries an opportunity to build around them. For
example, a country threatened with a loss of its enrichment ser-
vices would have an incentive to develop its own capability or
find another supplier. In addition, once a country detonated
a bomb, some countries would be encouraged to cultivate the
friendship of the proliferator; the unanimity required for ef-
fective sanctions could not be relied on. Nacht contended that
some countries loomed larger in applying sanctions than others.
The US had a good track record for effective unilateral arm-
twisting in the interest of non-proliferation, even in the absence
of international consensus.
Rowen traced many of the difficulties of combatting pro-
liferation to the process of decision-making. Policy makers
only had to make a commitment to the next incremental step, which
didn't necessarily imply an irrevocable decision for nuclear
weapons. Scheinman agreed, but thought the world was now more
proliferation-conscious and this made it harder to play this
game. G. Skolnikoff of MIT and Raiffa saw a political value in
having certain decisions recognized as crucial regardless of the
intent behind them. Schelling added that he knew no way to
distinguish between a government that was doing its best to hold
the line by compromising with weapons advocates where it least
mattered, from a government that was keeping its options open,
but wanted to approach the capability of producing weapons. The
difficulty of deciding on intentions put an high premium on
coming to an agreeemnt on the obligatory interpretation we would
place on a government's actions.
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Afternoon Session
H. Rowen
When the workshop reconvened after quiche and salad, Henry
Rowen of Stanford delivered his paper entitled "The Relation of
Technical to Institutional Factors in a Non-Proliferation Strategy."
In his remarks, Rowen noted with concern the growing access of
countries to readily fissionable materials as a by-product of
the spread of civilian nuclear technology and the concomitant
increased incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. The main task
was to design mixes of technologies and political arrangements
that strengthened incentives in non-nuclear states to remain
without nuclear weapons, and to encourage international ties and
technical postures which were more stable in crises than was
likely now. These objectives would have to be compatible with
economic and reliable suppliers of energy as well as enhance
perceived security in non-weapon states.
Countries were led to demand nuclear weapons because of
perceived threats from regional adversaries and concerns that
the latter might suddenly acquire nuclear explosives. Factors
which inhibited the demand for nuclear weapons were: the uncertain
response of larger powers, worries that future conflicts might
be enormously distructive, and fear that nuclear weapons might
escape governmental control in internal disturbances.
The decision to acquire nuclear weapons was influenced on
the supply side by the marginal costs of steps beyond those under-
taken for non-military purposes. These costs varied with the
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size and sophistication of programs, but there were many products
useful for military as well as non-military programs. Another
class of costs were the risks associated with having or moving
towards nuclear weapons. The present rules offered civilian "cover"
for the incremental steps that might be undertaken for military
purposes. These ambiguities had a bearing on efforts to use the
time from commitment to making a bomb, or the time from diversion
to building explosives, for warning.
Some nuclear porgrams were so grossly uneconomic that this
was a useful indicator of more than economic incompetence. A
greater degree of agreement on economic criteria should be sought
in INFCE even if consensus was unattainable.
Rowen next discussed rules of international conduct whose
objective was to increase the critical time to a bomb. The
current generation of reactors without recycle provided a benchmark.
This meant no highly enriched uranium except in research reactors
and did not square with the use of centrifuges or wider dis-
semination of laser technology for uranium enrichment. In some
cases the removal of spent fuel was appropriate. The benchmark
was incompatible with regional reprocessing; the problem with
reprocessing was the product, not ownership of the plant.
The adoption of this benchmark would make diversion of weapons-
grade materials stand out more clearly against the civilian nuclear
background. If a government were to move toward a bomb, more
actions would have to be undertaken covertly, and if such moves
were detected, the signals would be less ambiguous.
A longer critical time and the availability of clear signals
did not necessarily mean warning; this required interpretation of
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signals. Even with warning there might be no effective action
as in the case of India. However, action based on early warning
offered the possibility of deflecting moves at lower cost.
Rowen described the issue of discrimination in applying
international urles of conduct as troubling. Discrimination
between weapon and non-weapon states was incorporated into the
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and was practiced by governments
in their nuclear export policies. While nuclear power was more
or less competitive in larger states, it was uneconomic in most
developing countries. A rule that attempted to draw a line among
states would be difficult to sell de jure, even if widely applied
de facto. Such "split" systems might prove to be politically
acceptable, but acceptance would be aided by political arrangements
which made evident that no economic discrimination was intended.
Weaker rules of nuclear conduct would permit mixed oxide
fuel, but preclude highly enriched uranium, plutonium, U-233
except perhaps in irradiated or spiked form. Critical time to a
bomb of a few days was better than nothing. Isotope separation
for uranium could be restricted to weapons states or to inter-
nationally-owned or safeguarded plants. This was especially
desirable if isotope separation technologies with short critical
times were in danger of being widely adopted.
Discussion
Following presentation of the paper, Rowen opened the second-
round of discussion by reiterating the following points: the rule
of international nuclear conduct shoudl be to limit immediate access
to weapons grade material, the LWR without plutonium recycle
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was the logical standard agains which to compare other nuclear
systems for their proliferation resistance, and international
commerce in plutonium and reprocessing services was undesirable,
independently of how it was managed.
Schelling cautioned that ownership of weapons grade material
was an important institutional parameter. If ownership of
materials were shared, a country could not misuse materials with-
out absconding with another's property. The violation of rules and
contracts was a serious break. Rowen contered that shared owner-
ship in itself was not a deterrent in the event of crisis. There
was some utility in knowing where things were going, but that was
insufficient grounds for confidence.
Greenwood thought it instructive to discuss Rowen's bench-
mark nuclear system in relationship to clusters of nuclear systems as
they tended naturally to emerge along a continuum of proliferation
resistance. Nuclear systems in Cluster I would not employ ex-
plosives-useable material and would not provide any opportunity
to use the fuel cycle to produce such material. Cluster II con-
tained systems where facilities might exist within the fuel cycle
that could be used to gain access to explosives--useable material
but the cost, time, difficulty and warning time of doing so would
be at least as great as if such material were made outside the fuel
cycle. Cluster III systems had facilities from which weapons-useable
material could be gotten easier from the fuel cycle than outside
it. Cluster III systems would have weapons-useable material moving
in the fuel cycle but would still leave safeguards and physical
protection. Technological barriers to proliferation fell from I
.,  -r --rr------ I I - P-·l -- ------- - - - '- - I I - - - Ir
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to IV leaving institutional barriers as the strongest protection
against proliferation. Possession of an enrichment facility
would jump a country from I to III. A reprocessing facility
could possibly be modified to prevent a country moving into the
Cluster III category. Rowen remarked that today's rules placed
us in Cluster IV.
Harris expressed doubt that Rowen would find consensus on
rules for the once-through light water reactor unless he first won
acceptance of rules for demonstration breeders and commerce in
fissile plutonium. Countries were suspicious of attempts to side-
track their breeder programs and Rand was projecting demand for
plutonium in breeder programs in non-weapon states outside Europe
and Japan. Harris also thought that the IAEA required authority
to retrofit existing plants with new safeguards as they were de-
veloped. Culler responded that this authority was already found
to some extent in the NPT. and had been exercised in the area of
physical protection. Someone commented there had also been sig-
nificant changes in surveillance techniques at plant level. Schein-
man agreed but noted that compliance with upgraded safeguards
was voluntary.
Gray emphasized some positive features of an internationalized
fuel cycle; e.g., the checks and balances associated with mixed
ownership, internal auditing at several levels, the existence of
reprocessing facilities that were potential elements of a multi-
national organization,and the potential for natural economic
dominance to freely assert itself in such an organization. Rowen
responded that it did not matter who controlled the plant, but it
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did matter who controlled its products. Multinational ownership
of reprocessing facilities did not alleviate concerns about secure
fuel supply. Multinational ownership of enrichment plants held
more promise because one could be sure that low enriched uranium
alone was produced.
Culler summarized the elements of a consensus concerning the
technical and institutional aspects of proliferation reached by
the technical community at the Institutional Conference on Nuclear
Power held last spring in Salzburg, Austria. The technical experts
agreed: (1) that holding large inventories of fissile or irradiated
material in non-weapons states was improper, and it should be re-
moved; (2) that the safest place for plutonium might be in the re-
actor system; (3) on the necessity for international control,
even if international ownership were only a possibility; (4) on
the importance of real time accountability-the ability to strike
a material balance in 24 hours; (5) on a system of auditing; (6)
that upgrading of physical protection was possible; (7) that
plants be built to ensure remote disabling if inspectors were
removed; (8) that all streams be made radioactive; and, finally,
(9) on the need for sanctions. Given proper institutions, tech-
nical solutions can aid and abet non-proliferation goals.
Rose warned of a clear divide between weapons and non-weapons
states that created suspicions among LDCs. The US appeared as
an unreliable partner and the LDCs appeared vulnerable to a
supplier's cartel. As a consequence they might try to go the
nculear route alone. Dunn sensed that strengthening safeguards
and applying sanctions to breaches at the back-end of the fuel
--- ·111----·11 111(1111111111111111111111111111) -- - -lhli
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cycle could gain legitimacy internationally. Carnesale inter-
jected that fear of sanctions might encourage countries into
separate nuclear development. Dunn said it depended on the
sanctions and the limited number of countries with preponderant
influence.
Miller wondered whether an effective US policy on nonpro-
liferation was compatible with a view of nuclear power as a
"last resort." Rose answered that the US seemed to be of two
minds on nuclear energy, and that it projected an image of
ambiguity and uncertainty that threatened our leverage over other
countries. Carnesale saw the uncertainty working both ways.
It appeared as if we wanted to hold everybody else back to catch
up or as if we want to delay because it is not important to us.
L. Scheinman
Scheinman emphasized the political community's role in
providing institutional arrangements that could bridge the
gaps left by technology. However, he cautioned that both
technical and political approaches alone had real limits. The
spread of technology could not be averted over the long term.
This was true of the broad field of nuclear technology, and spe-
cifically some of its more sensitive components, such as reprocess-
ing and enrichment technologies. We could not overlook the moral
as well as practical dimensions of the problem. Efforts to deny
access to technologies having significant social and economic
promise would be perceived as discriminating and as exacerbating
the deep cleavages between haves and have-nots.
C·_ II __-l_-.l)_--__IL·_----- I I __
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Measures to control or deter the spread of potentially
inimical technologies could be sought through: (1) technical efforts
to design non-inimical technologies; (2) political/legal mechanisms
to secure agreement among technology suppliers as to what should
be supplied to whom; and (3) political/structural measures to ac-
commodate demandeurs by offering them opportunities to share in
the management, ownership and/or product of a facility.
The search for technical routes that reduced the inimical
characteristics of technologies was likely to yield only partially
satisfactory results and had to be accompanied by ancillary insti-
tutional and political measures. Institutional arrangements could
reinforce technical approaches and/or compensate for deficiencies
in technical approaches. The current risk was that in reacting
to perceived oversimplifications by the political community of
the reach of technological problem-solving, the technical com-
munity would place too great a burden of expectations on the poli-
tical community's ability to provide answers.
International institutional arrangements could enhance the
perceived trustworthiness of bilateral or multilateral legal
commitments to transfer resources. However, there were potential
costs to the technologically advanced states which advocated or
supported these institutions. The existence of institutions de-
prived the US of bilateral or, at least, weakened our leverage.
On the other hand, participation of key suppliers furthered the
US objective of securing a common posture. One other drawback
of institutions was the reduction in US flexibility to undertake
separate initiatives.
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Scheinman adverted to the international fuel bank as an
example. The fuel bank is attractive because it could (1) serve
to provide added credibility to US commitments to assure reliable
supplies of nuclear fuel; (2) be a tangible indicator of the sincer-
ity of advanced nuclear states to avoid deepening discrimination
between haves and have-nots; and (3) delay the spread of sensitive
fuel cycle activities under national control. On the debit side,
the bank could: (1) curtail our ability to upgrade non-proliferation
conditions as new problems emerged; (2) limit our independence of
action; and (3) allow other countries to curcumvent supply pro-
hibitions imposed by the NRC, Congress or the President.
On balance, Scheinman was persuaded that the costs of es-
tablishing international institutions or political mechanisms to
support US non-proliferation objectives were outweighed by the
benefits. The bottom line was that if we sought to persuade
states to defer intended technological developments while exploring
alternative safer technical pathways, then we had to maximize
assurances regarding availability and accessibility of nuclear fuel
supplies. Access could not be subject to capricious political
conduct by suppliers.
A similar set of questions was raised regarding spent fuel
storage as the first component of a multi-national fuel cycle center.
Here it was necessary to determine whether establishment of spent
fuel storage committed the US to a broader range of activities,
e.g., reprocessing, or created a presumption with respect to the
next steps. How far could we go in making concessions to ensure
a sufficiently broad membership before diminishing returns set in?
It was also important to know the risk of prematurely enhancing
or re-inforcing national commitments to nuclear power by removing
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problems associated with the nuclear fuel cycle, e.g., disposal
of the spent fuel.
Discussion
Carnesale opened the last round of discussions by asking how
multinational fuel centers would influence the rate at which national
fuel centers spread.
Scheinman wondered whether this was the right question to
ask. We should not give up searching for combinations of tech-
nical and institutional measures that carried us beyond the levels
of safety seemingly guaranteed by multinationalizing sensitive
areas of the present fuel cycle. We should not hasten to prejudice
the technical evaluations of alternative fuel cycles; it was im-
portant to prove that the technical approaches offered no solution;
not to assume it. The institutional framework was a double lock
on the most proliferation resistant alternative technology. Carne-
sale pointed out that INFCE was considering multinational arrange-
ments for each fuel cycle alternative.
Greenwood cited the present LWR regime as an example of
a fuel cycle made more resistant to proliferation through an
institutional arrangment; i.e., providing limited supplies of low
enriched uranium. Layer after layer of further institutional
arrangements could be made to reinforce the inherent proliferation
resistance of this fuel cycle.
Rowen, after listening to Dunn's remark that Rowen's idea
of a benchmark standard denied the possibility of trade-offs
among institutional arrangements and the proliferation resistance
·---- · ' -- --··
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inherent in the technical make-up of the fuel cycle, expressed
his concern that there was a serious blurring of time in the
discussion. People were talking as if there were an array of
choices available now when there were not. There was a need for
more conscious and explicit recognition of the feasibility of
phasing in various technical and institutional measures as a
function of time.
Harris perceived an urgent need to institutionally retrofit
present reprocessing facilities in nuclear weapon countries before
INFCE's end two years hence. Unless we now guaranteed access to
these reprocessing facilities at fair prices, we would have to
contend with additional commitments to reprocessing centers by
non-weapon states.
Nacht thought INFCE had an image problem with institutional
measures being viewed as less substantive than the search for
proliferation-resistant technologies. He feared that INFCE's
value would be measured only by its success in finding the tech-
nical fix. More effort should be devoted to showing that insti-
tutional steps were not vacuous and to peddling some of the
better institutional ideas.
At this point, Schelling was asked to conclude the workshop
with his observations on the day's discussions.
He began by noting that the highest officials of the US
government hadn't become interested in the problems of proliferation
until three years ago and that a balanced view took a long time
to develop in a complex field where opinions were strongly held.
Only recently had policymakers begun to recognize the connections
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among domestic energy problems, foreign energy problems, nuclear
energy and proliferation. As a consequence, there had been an
abrupt change of direction in the US government from cultivating
nuclear energy throughout the world to warning of the dangers of
nuclear power.
Foreign governments were somewhat bewildered by US policy
and could not be blamed for suspecting skulduggery. Althouah
he didn't believe in it himself, he did admit that apparent skul-
duggery was the explanation with the highest a priori plausibility.
Even participants of the Ford-Mitre study were caught off guard
by how not only uncomprehensible but unbelievable and suspicious
their point of view appeared to foreigners who probably knew the
previous US position better than they did,and were able to be
uncomprehending and suspicious in a way the Ford-Mitre group was
unable to anticipate.
Schelling was heartened that governments which were expected
to acquire nuclear weapons fifteen years ago had not, and could
no longer do so overtly, given their adherence to the NPT. He
speculated that there must be a long period of internal debate
about the merits of acquiring nuclear weapons before countries
were prepared to renounce them. We could perhaps coax these
countries through the maturing periods during which they overcame
the nuclear temptation. The US could take credit for the fact
that there had been no overt demonstrations that nuclear weapons
could do countries any good except in the East-West nuclear
strategy stand-off.
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We could help other governments to come to an appreciation
that they didn't want the dangers implicit in owning nuclear
weapons or weapons grade materials. We could help them find an
excuse for not going down the proliferation path by offering
respectable ways of putting weapons grade material at arm's length
physically, legally, financially or commercially. The primary
use of military force was internal, not external. Making govern-
ments think about the problems involved in assigning responsibility
for weapons grade materials would have the advantage of making
them question whether they would rather be free of the problem
altogether.
His final thought was that institutional arrangements were
better used as a vehicle for getting other governments to stop
and think about the seriousness of a decision to acquire weapons
rather than as a way for us to tie their hands and thus provoke
resistance.
Postscript
Several major themes dominated the discussions:
(1) The problem of civilian cover; in particular, could
an economic test expose programs which had joint military and
civilian objectives.
(2) The relative virtues of country-specific vs. generic
approaches to the development of insights into the problem of
assessing the proliferation resistance of nuclear systems. A
related issue was how to judiciously blend technical and political
measures so as to maximize proliferaiton resistance.
_ __C I I_ P----*l--·ll
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(3) The efficacy of sanctions; there was general agreement
that the track record of the international community was poor
in this respect, not because of a lack of warning but a lack of
political will. More study should be given to the sanctions
question, keeping in mind, however, that
(4) carrots were just as important as sticks. We must
recognize the legitimate nuclear aspirations of other countries.
International nuclear fuel cycle centers for enrichment, reprocess-
ing, and spent fuel storage were seen as a way of advancing
nonproliferation objectives while blurring the distinction between
nuclear haves and have-nots. Countries should also be persuaded
that nuclear weapons are not worth the financial and political
costs; however, it might be hard for the US to preach this gospel
while sitting on top of a gigantic arsenal.
Among the post-mortems on the workshop which have been
received to date, the comments of Warren Donnelly seem particularly
germane at this point: "If you publish a summary, it would help
greatly to write in basic English and to avoid the special
vocabularies which are appearing. For example, there must be a
better, less artificial word than 'attributes.' Why not %harac-
teristics?' Sooner or later those who write and think about
proliferation will have to take their ideas out of the warm
nest. When that time comes, the ideas should be readable and
understandable by the uninitiated, particularly Members of Congress
and their staff." We hope that we have provided an accurate
account of the workshop in the spirit of Donnelly's remarks.
M.D.
M.M.
_ _ I  ___ __ _ ___ _____ ·_ __ __ __I_·__I_______I_ _ _ I_____·
AGENDA
WORKSHOP ON INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF
PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE
Harvard Program for Science and International Affairs
Monday, December 19, 1977
8:30 a.m. Coffee
Introduction
An Overview of NASAP
Attributes, Games, Decisions
and Proliferation Resistance
A. Carnesale, PSIA
H. Kendrick, DOE
M. Miller, MIT
Discussion
Lunch
12:30 p.m. Tailoring Institutional Con-
straints as Complements to
Technological Barriers to
Proliferation
H. Rowen, Stanford
Discussion
Nonproliferation and Inter- L. Scheinman,
national Fuel Cycle Facilities: State Department
Some Cautionary Notes'?
Discussion
Concluding Remarks T. Schelling,
Harvard
9:00
9:15
9:30
10:00
11:45
1:00
1:45
2:15
3:45
_ I __
MIT/PSIA/DOE WORKSHOP ON INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
OF PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE
HARVARD PROGRAM FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Monday, December 19, 1977
ATTENDEES
Dr. A. Carnesale
Program for Science and
International Affairs
Harvard University
9 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Mr. H. Curtis
Division of International Affairs
U.S. Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20545
Mr. Joseph Dietrich
Combustion Engineering
9481-4-20
1000 Prospect Hill Road
Windsor, Connecticut 06095
Mr. Warren Donnelly
Library of Congress
Environment and Natural Resources
Policy Division
Main Building, Room 217
Washington, DC 20540
Professor P. Doty
Harvard University
Program for Science and
International Affairs
9 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Dr. L. Dunn
The Hudson Institute
Quaker Ridge Road
Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520
Mr. John Gray
International Energy Associates, Ltd.
2600 Virginia Avenue
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20037
Dr. T. Greenwood
OSTP
Executive Office of the President
New Executive Office Building
Room 3026
Washington, DC 20500
Professor G. Rathjens
Department of Political Science 9-435
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Professor D. Rose
Department of Nuclear Engineering 24-212
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Mr. R. Rosenthal
Division of International Security
US Department f Energy
Washington, DC 20545
Professor H. Rowen
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305
Professor T. Schelling
Littauer 220
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Dr. L. Scheinman
T Room 7208
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520
Professor E. Skolnikoff
Department of Political Science E53-473
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Dr. E. Stracker
Science Applications, Inc.
8400 West Park Drive
McLean, Virginia 22101
Dr. A. Weitzberg
Science Applications, Inc.
8400 West Park Drive
McLean, Virginia 22101
Mr. F. Williams
Harvard University
Program for Science and
International Affairs
9 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Professor E. Gyftopoulos
Department of Nuclear Engineering 24-109
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Mr. W. Harris
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California 90406
Dr. H. Kendrick
US Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20545
Dr. Marvin Miller
Department of Nuclear Engineering 24-212
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Mr. A. Mowrey
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D.C. 20545
Dr. M. Nacht
Harvard University
Program for Science and
International Affairs
9 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Dr. J. Papazoglou
Department of Nuclear Engineering NW13-201
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Dr. A. Perry
Institute for Energy Analysis
Oak Ridge Associated Universities
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830
Professor H. Raiffa
Morgan Hall 302
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field Road
Boston, Massachusetts 02163
Professor N. Rasmussen
Department of Nuclear Engineering 24-102
Massachusetts Institite of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
